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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action for judicial deten11ination of the respective 
interests of the parties in the proceeds from the sale of dairy cows. Fan11ers National Bank 
asserts that its perfected security interest created pursuant to Idaho Code §28-9-101, et seq., 
constitutes a first priority lien on dairy cows and the proceeds from the sale of those dairy cows. 
Hull Fam1s, Inc.; Ernest Daniel Carter dba Carter Hay and Livestock ("Dan Carter"); Lewis 
Becker; Jack McCall; and Tim Thornton (the "Agricultural Commodity Dealers"), assert that 
their agricultural commodity liens on agricultural products created pursuant to Idaho Code §45-
1801, et. seq., extend from the products to the dairy cows that consumed the products and the 
proceeds from the sale of those dairy cows and have priority over Fan11ers National Bank"s 
perfected security interest. Fanners National Bank asserts that Idaho Code §45-1801, et seq. 
does not provide for the extension of agricultural commodity liens on agricultural products to 
livestock which consume those products or the proceeds from the sale of the livestock. 
The dairy cows were owned by Green River Dairy, LLC, and Herculano J. Alves 
and Frances M. Alves, husband and wife, dba Green River Dairy ("Green River Dairy"). 
However, the amount claimed by Farmers National Bank and the total amount claimed by the 
five Ag1icultural Commodity Dealers exceeds the amount received as proceeds from the sale of 
the dairy cows, such that the owners of the dairy cows have no claim to the proceeds. 
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COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Farn1ers National Bank filed a Complaint for Declaratory .Tudf:,iment (R. Vol. L pp. 
17-34) seeking a judicial determination that its security interest by UCC-1 F financing statements 
filed pursuant to Idaho Code §28-9-101, ct. seq., constituted a first priority lien on the dairy cows 
and the proceeds from the sale of the dairy cows. 
Hull Farms, Inc., filed an Answer (R. Vol. I, pp. 35-41) asserting that it had 
priority to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-1801, ct. seq., and its filing of a Forn1 
C-1 Af,rricultural Products lien. 
Tim Thornton filed an Answer (R. Vol. I, pp. 42-46) asserting that he had priority 
to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-1801, et. seq., and his filing ofa Fonn C-1 
Af:,YTicultural Products lien. 
Lewis Becker filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim (R. Vol. I, pp. 47-
58) that he had priority to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-1801, et. 
and his filing of a Fom1 C-1 Agricultural Products lien and seeking a money judgment and 
lien foreclosure against Green River Dairy. 
Green River Dairy filed an Answer (R. Vol. I, pp. 59-61) generally denying that 
Farmers National Bank was entitled to relief. 
Jack McCall filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-Claims (R. Vol. L pp. 
75) asserting that he had priority to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code §45-180 l, et. seq., and 
his filing of a Fom1 Agricultural Products lien and seeking a money judgment and lien 
foreclosure against Green Dairy. 
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Dan Carter filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-Claims (R. Vol. I, pp. 76-
97) asserting that he had priority to the proceeds pursuant to Idaho Code §45-1801, et. seq .. and 
his filing of a Form C-1 Agricultural Products lien and seeking a money judgment and lien 
foreclosure against Green River Dairy. 
fanners National Bank filed a Reply to Counterclaim of Jack McCall (R. Vol, I, 
pp. 98-101), a Reply to Counterclaim of Lewis Becker (R. Vol. I, pp. 102-105), and a Reply to 
Counterclaim of Dan Carter (R. Vol. I, pp. 106-109) denying the entitlement to relief and 
reasserting its priority claims. 
Green River Dairy did not respond to the Cross Claims of Lewis Becker, Jack 
McCa11 or Dan Catier. 
Fanners National Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. I, pp. 110-
113) suppmied by affidavits and briefing. All other parties with the exception of Green River 
Dairy filed responsive affidavits and briefing. Lewis Becker filed a Motion for Summary 
Jud,gment (R. Vol. III, pp. 426-429) as did Jack McCa11 and Dan Catier (R. Vol. III, pp. 477-
481). Oral argument was held on April 9, 2012. On May 8, 2012, Judge Bevan entered his 
Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Augmentation Record 
pp. 1-13) denying relief to Farmers National Bank and granting summary judgment in favor of 
Hull f anns, Inc.; Tim Thornton; Lewis Becker; Jack McCall and Dan Cmier. 
Subsequently, a Judgment (R. Vol. III, pp. 564-569) was entered on May 30, 
2012, and an Amended Judgment (R. Vol. III, pp. 580-584) was entered on August 29, 2012. 
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Farmers National Bank filed an Amended Notice of Appeal (R. Vol. flI, pp. 585-589) to that 
Amended Judgment. 
OF THE FACTS 
Farmers 1\lational Bank that the following facts set forth in the Affidavit 
of Scott Tverdy (R. Vol. I, pp. J 30-1 ) and the Affidavit of John S. Ritchie (R. Vol. I, p. 142-
Vol. II, p. 386) are undisputed. Beginning April 25, 2008, Farmers National Bank made ten 
loans to Green River Dairy, all of which loans were guaranteed by Herculano J. Alves and 
Frances M. Alves, husband and wife, and The Mary Rose Haagsma Revocable Living Trust, the 
members of the LLC (R. Vol. I, p. 132). All of the loan and security documents are attached as 
Exhibits to the Complaint attached as Exhibit "4'' to the Affidavit of John S. Ritchie (R. Vol. I, p. 
157-Vol. II, p. 386). 
That prior to the fonnation of Green River Dairy, LLC, on Apri1 8, 2008, Farmers 
National Bank had made numerous loans to Hercu1ano J. Alves and Frances M. Alves, husband 
and wife, dba Green River Dairy, which loans were secured by security agreements and a UCC-
lF covering cattle (R. Vol. I, p. 133). That as additional security for the loans made to 
Green River Dairy, LLC, Herculano J. and Frances M. Alves, personally guaranteed the 
loans and granted Famers National Bank a security interest in all cattle owned by them and the 
UCC-1 F previously filed remained ofrccord with the Idaho Secretary of State (R. Vol. I, p. 133). 
That the security documents for the ten loans made to Green River Dairy, LLC, 
included the following: 
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a. State of Idaho - Farm Products Financing Statement - Form UCC-1 F 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on July 14, 2006, Filing 
Number F75997, and continued on May 27, 2011, Filing Number 
F47056: 
Debtor(s): Hcrculano Alves, Frances Alves and Green River Dairy 
Secured Party: Fanners National Bank 
Products: Triticale, oats, field com, hay, ensilage, dairy cattle and 
milk. 
b. State of Idaho - Fann Products Financing Statement - Form UCC-1 F 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on May 12, 2008, Filing 
Number F78573: 
Debtor(s): Green River Dairy LLC 
Secured Party: Farmers National Bank 
Products: Rye (including triticale), oats, field com, hay, ensilage, 
dairy cattle and milk. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 133; Vol. L pp. 32-34). 
That subsequent thereto the five Agiicultural Commodity Dealers delivered 
agricultural products to Green River Dairy, all of which agricultural products were fed to cattle 
owned by Green River Dairy. Those pmiies filed agricultural commodity dealer liens on the 
products delivered. The respective liens claimed by each of those parties are itemized in 
Appendix A of this Brief. The total of all filed C-1 lien claims is $185,404.71. 
Green River Dairy defaulted on its obligations to Fanners National Bank and 
Farmers National Bank took possession of the dairy cattle that were co11ateral for the ten loans 
(R. Vol. I, p. 134). The Complaint recites that Fam1ers National Bank disposed of some of the 
cattle at auction sale at Producers Livestock Marketing Association in Jerome, Idaho. The 
proceeds from the sale totaled $211,957 .58 and Producers Livestock issued two checks made 
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payable to Green River Dairy c/o Herculano J. Alves and Farmers National Bank and Hull 
Fanns, Inc., and Jack McCall and Dan Carter (R. Vol. I, p. 134). 
After the filing of the Complaint, the remainder of the cattle were sold. I1 was 
stipulated to by Farmers National Bank at oral argument that the disposition of all of the 
proceeds received by Fanners National Bank from the sale of cattle with the Green River Dairy 
brand would be governed by the Court's decision on the motions for summary judgment (Tr. pp. 
8-10). 
The amount due and owing to Farmers National Bank from Green River Dairy, 
LLC, which debt was guaranteed by Herculano J. Alves and Frances M. Alves, husband and 
wife, was $2,616,008.24 as of February 1, 2012 (R. Vol. I, p. 134). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did Judge Bevan err in interpreting Idaho Code §45-1802 as providing 
that an agricultural commodity dealer lien on an agricultural product extends to livestock which 
consume the product and the proceeds of sale of the livestock. 
2. Did Judge Bevan err in detem1ining that the five Agricultural Commodity 
Dealers have liens on the proceeds of sale of livestock, which are prior to the perfected security 
interest of Fanners National Bank in those proceeds. 
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ATTORNEYS FEES OJ\ APPEAL 
National Bank claims attorneys foes on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 




The central issue on appeal in this case is one of statutory interpretation. 
the Idaho Legislature enacted a new law which provided for the creation of a lien in favor of 
producers and dealers in agricultural products. The law was codified as Chapter 18 of Title 45 of 
the Idaho Code. The liens provided for are designated in the title of Chapter 18 as "Agricultural 
commodity dealer liens." The kind of lien provided for and the class of persons v.•ho may have 
the lien are generally set forth in Idaho Code 1802 which presently and at all times pertinent 
to this case reads as follows: 
45-1802. Lien created-Who may have.- An agricultural commodity producer or 
an agricultural commodity dealer who sells, or delivers under contract or 
bailment, an agricultural product has a lien on the agricultural product or the 
proceeds of the sale of the agricultural product as provided in section 45-1804, 
Idaho Code. The lien created in this chapter may attach regardless of whether the 
purchaser uses the agricultural product purchased to increase the value of his 
livestock or whether he uses the agricultural product purchased to maintain the 
value, health or status of his livestock without actually increasing the value of his 
agricultural product. 
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The second sentence of this section was added to the first by an amendment to the 
statute in l 989. This case concerns how the second sentence of this sectlon of the statute should 
be interpreted. Specifically, the issue is whether by the addition of the second sentence the Idaho 
Legislature changed the statute to provide that the lien could attach not only to agricultural 
products and the proceeds of sale of those products, as stated in the first sentence, but also to 
livestock which consumed those products. The District Court ruled that the second sentence 
unambiguously extends the lien to livestock. It is the contention of Fa1mers National Bank that 
it is a mistake to interpret the second sentence this way, that the 1989 amendment to the statute 
did not extend the scope of the lien beyond agricultural products and the proceeds of sale of such 
products, and, therefore, that the liens of the Agricultural Commodity Dealers did not extend to 
the livestock or proceeds of sale of the livestock which consumed the agricultural products to 
which their liens had attached. 
B. 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review for appeal from an order of summary judgment has been 
recently summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows: 
This Court reviews appeals from an order of summary judgment de nova, and the 
"standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on 
a motion for summary judgment." Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 
ldaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458, 461 (2008) (citations omitted). Thus summary 
jud,gment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Under this standard, "disputed facts are construed in favor 
of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Curlee, 148 Idaho at 394, 
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224 P .3d at 461. \\7here "the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, 
then only a question oflaw remains, over which this Court exercises free review." 
Lockheed 1\1artin C01p. v. Idaho State Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 1 P .3d 
641, 644 (2006). This Court exercises "free revie\v over interpreting a statute's 
meaning and applying the facts to the law." VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 
1, 109 P.3d 714, 719 (2005). 
Stonebrook Construction, LLC v. Chase Home Finance, 
376(2012). 
Idaho 927, 929, 277 P.3d 374, 
c. 
The District Court Erred in Applying the Applicable Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
Statutory interpretation begins with the wording of the statute and the threshold 
issue m statutory interpretation is whether the statute under review is ambiguous or 
unambiguous: 
Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous courts give effect to the 
statute as written, without in statutory construction. Only where the 
language is ambiguous will this Court look to rules of construction for guidance 
and consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations. 
Stonebrook Construction, LLC v. Chase Home 152 Idaho 927, 931, 277 P.3d 
374, 378 (2012) (citing Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & 148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 P.3d 
458, 465 (2008) with internal citations omitted). 
In its Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Augmentation Record pp. 1-13), the District Comi concluded Idaho Code 1802 to be 
unambiguous and that this section unambiguously means that. in addition to agricultural products 
and proceeds of sale of those products, agricultural commodity liens may attach to animals 
which consume those products. However, the District Court's interpretation of the meaning of 
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the statute rests upon considerations and rules of construction which only should come into play 
where the statute in question has been first judged to be ambiguous. Therefore, the District 
Court's analysis in support of its conclusion is fundamentally flawed, leads to an unsupportable 
interpretation of the statute and should be disregarded. 
Relying upon State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 476; 163 P.3d 1183, 1188 
(2007), the District Court states " [a statute's] ambiguity is contingent upon whether a number of 
reasonable interpretations can be made regarding its meaning." (Augmentation Record p. 7). In 
Yzaguirre the Court was confronted with two litigants each of whom asserted that the statute 
under review was unambiguous, but who each advocated a different interpretation of what the 
statute meant. The Court concluded that only one of these interpretations was reasonable and 
that, therefore, the statute was unambiguous. (Augmentation Record p. 7). In this general 
respect the District Court's analysis in this case minor's the Supreme Court's analysis m 
Yzaguirre. But a closer reading of Yzaguirre reveals a crucial difference. 
In Yzaguirre the conflicting interpretations had to do with how the grammar of 
the statute was to be construed. It had nothing to do with which interpretation was "reasonable" 
from the standpoint of sensible or sound legislation. The parties and the Supreme Court's focus 
was on determining the plain meaning of the words of the statute. The interpretations of the 
parties diverged on the question of the import of the placement of a comma in the text of the 
statute. The Court concluded as a matter of ordinary grammar that only one of the two 
interpretations advocated was reasonable. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - I 0 
In the case before the Court today, hovvever, the District Court's analysis does not 
focus on what is reasonable or not so far as discerning the plain meaning of the words of the 
statute. The District Court looks to which of two proposed interpretations results in a law which, 
in the Court's view, is reasonable and not absurd in its application. But the reasonableness or 
absurdity of a law is not a valid consideration when interpreting an unambiguous statute, or 
deciding whether a statute is ambiguous in the first place. In Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011) the Idaho Supreme Court 
declined to address the plaintiff's argument that a statute could not be construed as it was plainly 
written if the statute, so construed, was patently absurd, noting: 
Thus, we have never revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground that 
it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written, 
and we do not have the authority to do so. 
!bid. at p. 896. Likewise, the fact that the plain meaning of a statute implies harsh results in the 
statute's application does not allow a court to construe an unambiguous statute to mean 
something different from what the legislature has said: 
However, the "public policy of legislative enactments cannot be questioned by the 
courts and avoided simply because the comis might not agTee with the public 
policy so announced." State v. Village o.fGarden City, 74 Idaho 513, 525, 265 P. 
2d 328, 334 ( 1953). Therefore, this Court's duty is "to interpret the meaning of 
legislative enactments without regard to possible results." Id. 
... Although the result for Stonebrook is harsh, it is the result the Legislature 
intended. We are not at liberty to disregard this legislative detcnnination as to the 
most effective means of protecting the public. 
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Stonebrook Construction, LLC at pp. 932-933. Therefore, even if the plain meaning of a statute 
is perceived to produce absurd or harsh results, that does not allow reaching beyond its plain 
meaning to construe the statute to mean something different from what the words of the statute 
plainly say. 
D. 
The District Court erred in concluding that an amendment to a statute must always change 
preexisting law 
The District Court first found the interpretation of Idaho Code §45-802 advocated 
by Fanner's National Bank to be unreasonable on the basis that if the second sentence does not 
expand the scope of the lien beyond agricultural products to livestock which consume those 
products, then the second sentence adds nothing to what the first sentence says and is, therefore, 
superfluous. Citing the rule of construction that "a court should not interpret a statute in a way 
that would render it superfluous" the Court found Farmers National Bank's interpretation 
unreasonable. (Augmentation Record p. 8). However, this rule of construction is properly 
employed only after the meaning of a statute has been detennined to be ambiguous. Because the 
second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 was added as an amendment to a preexisting statute, 
the more applicable rule of construction is the presumption that an amendment to a statute 
indicates an intent to change the statue's meaning. Gonzalez. v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 883, 
231 P. 3d 524, 528 (2009). However, "[T]he presumption does not apply where statute's 
meaning is not in doubt." Am Jur 2d, Statutes §63. Moreover, an amendment to a statute may 
simply clarify or strengthen a statute without altering or changing it. Pearl v. Board of 
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Professional Discipline of Idaho State Board of Medicine, 137 Idaho 107, 114, 44 P. 3d I 162, 
1169 (2002); Stonecipher v. Stonecipher. 131 Idaho 731, 735, 963 P. 2d 1168, 1172 (1998 ). 
Jn Stonecipher, the amendment in question simply added one sentence to Idaho 
Code §5-245. The Court noted that the added sentence did not change the statute from what it 
was before the amendment: 
No alteration was made to the statute as it previously existed. The amended 
version simply clarified the language of the original statute by providing a list, 
though non-exhaustive, of terms to be encompassed by "an action or proceeding 
to eolleet child support arrearages." 
!bid at p. 735. Therefore, if the second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 is unambiguous as it 
stands, then there is no basis for applying rules of eonstruetion to make the second sentence 
mean something other than what it plainly says, even though when plainly read the second 
sentence does not alter or change preexisting law. 
E. 
The District Court also erred reasoning that un]ess the second sentence extends the scope of 
the things to which the lien may attach, it is self-contradictory and meaningless. 
The District Court also concluded that if the second sentence does not extend the 
scope of the lien to livestock which consume agricultural products, then the second sentence 
would not only be superfluous, it would also be "self-contradictory and meaningless." 
(Augmentation Record p. 9). The District Court reasoned as follows: 
However, with such an interpretation, the triggering act of "using the agricultural 
product to feed livestock simultaneously give the product its clarified 
classification-agricultural product subject to a lien-and strips it of that lien as it 
would not extend to the livestock once it is consumed-or "used." Interpreting 
language such that it both bestows a category and strips it at the same moment 
renders the sentence self-contradictory and meaningless. 
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(Augmentation Record p. 9). In a footnote to this passage, the Court amplifies its point 
as follows: 
The court notes that Farmers' interpretation would be more reasonable if 
the statute had indicated that the 1 ien attaches regardless of whether the purchaser 
intends to use or ~wilf use the product in the ways described in the second 
sentence. However, the statute does not read that way. [Emphasis added] 
(Augmentation Record p. 9). However, because the statute states that the lien attaches to a 
product regardless of the purpose for which agricultural product is used, does not imply that 
the lien does not attach to the product until the product is used. The sentence is a statement that 
certain events do not affect whether a lien attaches; it is not a statement about when a lien 
attaches. In any case, Idaho Code 1803 which immediately follows Idaho Code §45-1802 is 
captioned and sets forth "\\lhen lien attaches," which clearly dispels any reason for reading the 
second sentence of Section 1802 as having anything to do with when the lien attaches. Thus 
plainly read, the second sentence is not self-contradictory and meaningless. 
Even if one reaches the District Court 1s conclusion that the second sentence 
implies an absurd result unless it is construed to mean that a lien on an agricultural product 
attaches to livestock which consume the product, such absurdity does not allow a court to depart 
from the plain meaning of an unambiguous sentence. As the Idaho Supreme Cowi has stated in 
Verska, if a comi finds that the plain unambiguous meaning of a statute is" patently absurd," it 
is not the role of the Comi to rewrite the statute. But this is just what the District Court did in 
case. 
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The meaning of the second sentence is plain enough: it states that the lien created 
under "this chapter" (chapter Eighteen of Title 45) may attach "regardless of whether the 
purchaser uses the agricultural product purchased to increase the value of his livestock or 
whether he uses the agricultural product purchased to maintain the value, health or status of his 
livestock without actually increasing the value of his a,gTicultural product." Predicating the 
attachment of a lien on goods to the use to which the good are put, is not without precedent. The 
Uniform Commercial Code, for example, defines consumer goods as "goods that are used or 
bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Idaho Code §28-9- J 02 
(23). But when such goods commence to be used for such purposes is not relevant for 
determining when a security interest attaches to those goods. Likewise, because the second 
sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 states that the lien created attaches regardless of certain 
subsequent uses of the goods, it does not imply the lien attaches only when the goods are used. 
It simply states that the lien attaches regardless. Thus interpreted the sentence is neither self-
contradictory in its meaning or absurd in its result. 
When the second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 is read in a plain and 
straightforward way, free of the demand and constraint that the section must mean something 
very different with the addition of the second sentence than without it, there is nothing in its 
plain mea11ing which says that an agricultural commodity lien attaches to livestock. All the 
sentence says is that the lien created in "this chapter," "may attach regardless of whether the 
purchaser uses the agricultural product purchased to increase the value of his livestock or 
whether he uses the agricultural product purchased to maintain the value, health or status of his 
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livestock without actually increasing the value of his agricultural product." There is nothing in 
the plain meaning of this sentence to the effect that the lien may also attach to livestock which 
consume an agricultural product. There is no reasonable interpretation of the plain meaning of 
the words of the second sentence which leads to the conclusion that the second sentence means 
that an agricultural commodity lien attaches to livestock which consume the product. To 
conclude otherwise, moreover, would directly conflict with the plain definition of "agricultural 
product" in Idaho Code §45-1801 (1 )-- which does not include livestock-- and the plain meaning 
of the first sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 that the lien created attaches only to an agricultural 
product or the proceeds of sale of an agricultural product. 
The District Court reasoned that unless the second sentence adds something to the 
first sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802, then the second sentence is "superflous" and 
"meaningless." (Augmentation Record pp. 8-9). However, ifthe meaning of the second sentence 
standing by itself, is plain and unambiguous, then the court is not at liberty to invoke rules of 
construction to go beyond or against that plain meaning. If the court had first concluded that the 
second sentence were ambiguous, then it would have been appropriate for the court to have 
invoked the rule of construction that an amendment to a statute is presumed to change the import 
of the statute from what it was prior to the amendment. In this case, however, the District Comi 
declined to adopt a straightforward interpretation of tl1e words of the second sentence only 
because it reasoned that read in this way, the second sentence would add nothing to the first. 
The District Court also concluded that the second sentence was "superfluous" 
standing by itself. The Court's reasoning in support of this conclusion is not persuasive. The 
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Court reasons, in effect, that if the second sentence simply clarifies that the lien created by the 
first sentence attaches to an agricultural product of how the product is used, then this 
means that the lien does not attach to the product until it is used. This is an unwarranted leap of 
logic. The sentence states that the lien may attach regardless of whether the product is used to 
maintain or increase the value of livestock. ln other words, it states that the lien may attach 
regardless of what the subsequent use of the product might be. If the second sentence had read 
that the lien may attach only if and when the purchaser uses the product in a certain way, then the 
District Court's reasoning would have a point. But this is plainly not what the second sentence 
says and there is no basis whatsoever for the District Court's conclusion that the second sentence 
standing by itself is "self-contradictory and meaningless." (Au1:,Tffientation Record p. 9). 
F. 
The District Court's conclusion that the Agricultural Commodity Dealer's interpretation is 
reasonable is wrong. 
Having concluded that Fam1ers National Bank's interpretation of the second 
sentence is unreasonable, the District Court proceeds to conclude that the Agricultural 
Commodity Dealers' (referred to by the Court as "Sellers") interpretation on the other band is 
reasonable. (Augmentation Record p. 10). But again the District Court fails to focus on what 
the words of the second sentence plainly say, and attributes a meaning to the second sentence 
which goes far beyond the ordinary import of the words of which it is composed. The District 
Court stated the most convincing factor it found in finding the sellers' interpretation reasonable 
as follows: 
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The most convmcmg factor to this court is how the second sentence 
implements the word, "uses.'' As identified above, "uses" is the triggering verb in 
the second sentence; however, once the agricultural product is 'used' to increase 
or maintain the value of livestock, the agricultural product is no long in a state of 
livestock feed-it has been ingested and is not distinguishable from the livestock 
that ingested it. The second sentence indicates that the agricultural lien attaches 
even when this triggering event occurs. To the court, this means that the 
agricultural lien attaches to the feed, and continues if commingled with livestock 
through the livestock's use-or consumption-regardless of whether the agricultural 
product increased the livestock's value, or maintained its value. 
(Augmentation Record p. 10). The Comi states that "'uses' is the triggering verb in the second 
sentence." A triggering verb may be a novel grammatical concept, but what the District Comi 
seems to mean by this is that "uses" refers to the event which causes the lien to attach to 
livestock. But even though the second sentence plainly refers to how a purchaser uses an 
agricultural product, the District Comi ends up speaking in tenns of how livestock use an 
agricultural product. Apaii from this confusion, the District Comi's point seems to be that at the 
moment an agricultural product is ingested by an animal, it is no longer distinguishable from the 
animal that ingested it. Again, this is simply not the case. Feed remains identifiable for a while 
in the animal's digestive tract, and a considerable amount, molecule for molecule, ends up as 
excrement. Does the lien attach to manure as well? And, what about milk and offspring? 
It is apparent from the District Comi's analysis that its interpretation of the second 
sentence as meaning that a lien on an agricultural product also attaches to an animal which 
consumes it, is driven by the fundamental consideration that unless the second sentence expands 
the scope of the lien created by the first sentence, it is superfluous. But thus driven, the Comi's 
interpretation of the second sentence strays far beyond what can be naturally and easily discerned 
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from what is otherwise its plain meaning. The confusion about verbs and uses is 
illustrative. But if the second sentence is plain and unambiguous as it stands, the principle of 
statutory construction that an amendment to a statute must be read as changing or adding 
something to preexisting law does not apply and there is no reason to strain beyond the plain 
meaning of the second sentence merely because as plainly interpreted it adds nothing to the 
sentence which precedes it. The Agricultural Commodity Deal s interpretation of the second 
sentence, which is adopted by the District Court, is not reasonable. 
The District Court concludes its analysis of the meaning of the second sentence 
by noting that not only does its interpretation not render the second sentence superfluous, but it 
also "benefits the intended protected class of an agricultural lien-the agricultural producers." 
(Augmentation Record p. 11 ). However, if indeed the second sentence is unambiguous as the 
District concluded, then the extent to which the sentence as interpreted furthers legislative or 
public policy is inelevant as this Court has held in Stonebrook Construction. LLC. This is but a 
final instance of the District Court's inclination to muddle the interpretation of an unambiguous 
statute with principles of statutory construction. 
G. 
The second sentence is unambiguous and Farmers National Bank's interpretation of that 
sentence is reasonable. 
As reflected by the amicus briefs which have been filed in this case, the issues in 
this case beyond the interests of the litigants. As United States Bankruptcy Judge Pappas said 
at the beginning of his decision in a case in which the central issue was identical to the one in 
this case-how the second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 is to be interpreted- "the potentially 
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implications of the Cou1i's holding will likely impact many participants in the agri-
credit As a result, the stakes in this case are substantial." In Re Goedhart & Goedhart. 
03.3 IBCR l , 167 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003). A copy of Judge Pappas' Memorandum of 
Decision in that case is attached to this Brief as Appendix B. With the awareness of that fact, 
Judge Pappas held in his thorough and well reasoned decision that, like the first sentence, the 
second sentence of Idaho Code §45-1802 is unambiguous and that the plain meaning of the 
second sentence does not the scope or kinds of property to which an agricultural 
commodity lien can attach. It simply clarifies the first sentence: 
Ibid. at 
The second sentence of the statute, added in 1989, is also plain on its 
It clarifies the first sentence. It explains that the statutory agricultural commodity 
lien created by the first sentence shall attach to the agricultural product, and to the 
proceeds from the sale of that product, without regard to whether the purchaser 
uses the commodity for either of two different purposes, namely, to increase the 
value of livestock or to maintain the value of livestock. Again, \vhile it easily 
could have done so, the Legislature did not utilize language in the l 989 
amendment to Idaho Code §45-1802 that expands the scope or kinds of property 
to which a commodity lien will attach. 
170. Judge Pappas goes on to note that interpreting the second sentence according 
to its plain meaning does not render the sentence superfluous: 
Construing the statue according to its plain meaning does not render any 
portion of the commodity lien law superfluous .... [ citation omitted]. Granted, 
interpreting the second sentence as a clarification that a commodity lien can attach 
to the agricultural product or the proceeds from its subsequent sale, 
notwithstanding the purchaser's use of the agricultural product may not effect any 
extensive change in the reach or impact of the statute. However, such an 
interpretation is consistent with the import of the language of the statute. 
Ibid. at pages 171-172. 
H. 
Even if Idaho Code §45-1802 is ambiguous, applying the rules of statutory construction 
does not change the result. 
In his decision in Jn Re: Goedhart & Goedhart, Judge Pappas reasons that even if 
the addition of the second sentence to Idaho Code §45-1802 rendered the statute ambiguous, and 
the court considered "the full panoply of statutory construction tools, the interpretation given the 
statute by the Comi would be no different." Ibid at page 171. Looking at Chapter 18 of Title 45 
as a whole, Judge Pappas observes that not only in Idaho Code §45-1802, but also Idaho Code 
§45-1803 and I 805 "the Idaho Legislature indicated its intent that a commodity lien attach only 
to the agricultural product sold and to the proceeds from a subsequent sale of the product, but not 
to any other types of property." Ibid at page 171. In addition, Judge Pappas notes that the 
definition of "agricultural product" in Idaho Code §45-180 l ( l ), which the Idaho Legislature also 
amended in 1989, was amended to extend the definition to include agricultural products which 
had been processed into feed. Had the legislature intended at that time to also extend the lien to 
livestock which consumed an agricultural product, it could have done so in the amendment to the 
definition, but it did not. Ibid at page 171. Judge Pappas also notes that to read Idaho Code §45-
1 802 as extending the lien to livestock which consume an agricultural product would, in order to 
maintain consistency in tbe statute, require a detennination that Idaho Code §§45-1803 and 1805 
were amended by implication as well. This he points out would nm contrary to the rule that 
"Statutory amendment by implication is disfavored and will not be inferred absent clear 
legislative intent." Ibid at page 171. (See Thomas 11• Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 13 8 
Idaho 200, 209, 61 P.3d 557, 566 (2002). Finally, Judge Pappas concludes that "The legislative 
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history from the 1989 session offers no definitive insight into the legislature's intent because the 
commentators offered inconsistent views on the amendment's goal." Ibid at page 171. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the Amended Judgment entered by the trial court on 
August 29, 2012, which based upon the Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, granted declaratory judgment including costs and attorney's fees to Hull 
Fanns, Inc.: Tim Thornton; Lewis Becker; Jack McCall; and Dan Carter. 
Declaratory Judgment should be entered in favor of Fanners National Bank, 
including costs and attorneys fees, declaring that Idaho Code §45-1 802 does not provide that an 
agricultural commodity dealer lien on an agricultural commodity extends to the livestock which 
consume that commodity or to the proceeds of sale of the livestock, and that Farmers National 
Bank's security interest in the proceeds from the sale of cows belonging to Green River Dairy, is 
a first priority lien. 
DATED this 
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day of November, 2012. 
COLEMAN, RITCHIE & CLUFF 
/.JOµ}J S. RITCHIE 
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APPENDIX A __ ... ____ _ 
(Agricultural Commodity Dealer Liens Claimed and 
Filed by the Agricultural Commodity Dealers) 
1. Hull Farms, Inc.: 
a. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Fonn C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 4, 2011, Fi 1 ing 
Number Cl 549: 
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves 
Claimant: Hull 
Amount: $106,344.17 
Delivery Dates: May 
Crop: alfalfa hay 
2011, to June 26, 2011 
b. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 4, 2011, Filing 
Number Cl 
Purchaser: Frances Marie Alves 
Claimant: Hull Farms Inc. 
Amount: $106,344.17 
Delivery Dates: May 26, 2011, to June 26, 2011 
Crop: alfalfa hay 
c. State of Idaho -- Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products Fonn C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 4, 2011, Filing 
NumberC1551: 
Purchaser: Berkie Joseph Alves 
Claimant: Hull Farms Inc. 
Amount: $106,344 .1 7 
Delivery Dates: May 26, 2011, to June 26, 2011 
Crop: alfalfa hay 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF APPEh'DIX A - 25 
d. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Fonn C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 4, 2011, Filing 
Number Cl 
Purchaser: Green River Dairy 
Claimant: Hull Fanns Inc. 
Amount: S 106,344.17 
Delivery Dates: May 26, 2011, to June 26, 2011 
Crop: alfalfa hay 
The total amount of those claims is $106,344.17. 
2. Dan Carter: 
a. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on January 5, 2011, Filing 
Number C 1528: 
Purchaser: Green River Dairy 
Claimant: Ernest Daniel Carter 
Amount: $10,606.75 
Delivery Dates: October 24, 2010 
Crop: hay 
b. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products -··· Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on January 5, 2011, Filing 
Number C1529: 
Purchaser: Green River Dairy. LLC 
Claimant: Ernest Daniel Carter 
Amount: $10,606.75 
Delivery Dates: October 24, 20 l 0 
Crop: hay 
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c. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Af,'Ticultural Products - Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on January 5, 2011, Filing 
Number Cl 530: 
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves 
Claimant: Daniel Carter 
Amount: $10,606.75 
Delivery Dates: October 24, 2010 
Crop: hay 
d. State of Idaho -- Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products Fonn 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on January 5, 201], Filing 
Number Cl 531: 
Purchaser: Frances Marie 
Claimant: Ernest Daniel Carter 
Amount: $10,606. 7 5 
Delivery Dates: October 24, 2010 
Crop: hay 
e. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products ~ Fonn C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on April 2011, Filing Number 
Cl543: 
Purchaser: Green River Dairy 
Claimant: Carter Hay and Livestock 
Amount: $20,006.00 
Delivery Dates: January 1, 2011, to February 1, 2011 
Crop: hay 
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f State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on April 7, 2011, 
c 1544: 
Herculano Alves 
Claimant: Carter Hay and Livestock 
Amount: $20,006.00 
Delivery Dates: January 1, 2011, to February 1, 201 l 
Crop: hay 
The total amount of those claims is $30,612.75. 
Form 
Number 
a. State of Idaho - Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 23, 20 I l, Filing 
Number Cl 556: 
Purchaser: Frances Alves 
Claimant: Lewis Becker 
Amount: $4,815.00 
Delivery Dates: June 20, 2011, to June 30, 2011 
Crop: wheat 
b. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products Form 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 23, 2011, 
Number Cl 
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves 
Claimant: Lewis Becker 
Amount: $4,815.00 
Delivery Dates: June 20, 2011, to June 30, 2011 
Crop: wheat 
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c. State of Idaho - Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 23, 2011, Filing 
Number Cl 558: 
Purchaser: Frances Alves 
Claimant: Lewis Becker 
Amount: $3,840.00 
Delivery Dates: June 4, 2011, to June 30, 2011 
Crop: hay 
d. State of Idaho - Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on September 23, 2011, Filing 
Number Cl 559: 
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves 
Claimant: Lewis Becker 
Amount: $3,840.00 
Delivery Dates: June 4, 2011, to June 30, 2011 
Crop: hay 
The total amount of those claims is $8,655.00. 
4. Jack McCall: 
a. State of Idaho -- Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products - Fann C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on October 17, 2011, Filing 
Number C 1560: 
Purchaser: Green River Dairy, LLC 
Claimant: Jack McCall 
Amount: $19,696.25 
Delivery Dates: March 15, 2011, to May 26, 2011 
Crop: hay 
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b. State of Idaho WWW ?\otice of Lien in Agricultural Products Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on October 17, 2011, Filing 
Number Cl 561: 
Purchaser: Herculano Alves 
Claimant: Jack McCall 
Amount: $19,696.25 
Delivery Dates: March I 2011, to May 2011 
Crop: hay 
The total amount of those claims is S 19,696.25. 
5. Tim Thornton: 
a. State of Idaho -- Notice of in Agricultural Products -- Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on October 18, 2011, Filing 
NumberC1563: 
Purchaser: Herculano Joseph Alves 
Claimant: Tim Thornton 
Amount: $20,096.54 
DeliveryDates: June 2011,to.Tuly21,2011 
Crop: hay 
b. State of Idaho Notice of Lien in Agricultural Products Form C-1 
filed with the Idaho of State on October 18, 2011, Filing 
Number Cl564: 
Purchaser: River Dairy 
Claimant: Tim Thornton 
Amount: $20,096.54 
Delivery Dates: June 2, 2011, to July 21, 2011 
Crop: hay 
The total amount of those claims is $20,096.54. 
(R. Vol. IL pp. 387-409). 
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Here, thL: Cour1 concludes 
tlie JCtion in 
Debtcm:s clnim for damages, and 
consequently, the clwracler or any recovery he may ::ichicve The 
m:ilpracuce action wouid not have beer• filed "'bu! for" the bodily 
i njurie;; sustained by Debtor, as in the fiction 
l n that sense, Debtor seeb to recover from hrs former attorneys 
those damages he would have recovt:red ;n the acuon 
had :I been properly If Debtor had recovered in the 
urnkrlying personal or 
those proceeds would have been exempt under Idaho Code § 11 
604(! )\c), Thus. a:iy rcc:nvery in Lile act10n anribuwblc 
to Debtor's physirnl miuries may properly be claimed exempt under 
ldahc Code§ I l-604(1)(c). 
Without regard to the statute examined by the Panel m 
, the Court has previously ruled that ldal10 law limw, any 
excm;xion claim to a debtor's damages for actual bodily 
In re Lee, 962 LB.CR. 84, 86 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996) 
the term "bodily injury" did not encompass purely" ri1ental or 
emotional injury, but is limited to actual physical injury to the 
and the conse4uences thereof). Jn addition, the funds in question 
rnust also be ''reasonably necessary" for Debtors' or his 
support. Jn re Nielsen, 97.4 LB,CR 107, 108 (Bankr D. Idaho 
1997) (holding that annuity payments paid to debtor for medical 
expenses, when those payments were not reasonably necessary for 
her or her dependent's support, were not exempt). Whether Debtors 
are successful in securing a recovery in the legal malpractice action, 
and whether that recovery is att;ibutable to a bodily injury and is 
also reasonably necessary for Debtors' support, remains to be seen. 
An evidentiary hearing may be required at a later date to determine 
the answer to these important questions. 
IV, Conclusion. 
As matter of law, Debtors can not assert an exemption in any 
recovery from the action under either Idaho Code § I i-
i i-603(5). However, Debtors may properly claim an 
in the of the malpractice claim uncler 
Idaho Code§ I l-604(!)(c), but only if Debtors can establish that 
such represents for a bodily injury ar:d that 
it is reasonably necessary for the support of Debtors and their 
Becm1se al lins time there is no settlement or recovery, 
Debtors obviously can not make such a showir;g, and me Court 
cnnnol make final of Trustee's objection LO Debtors' s 
claim. If Debtors receive a recovery from tile action, and 
i r the pnrties cannot otherwise resolve the respective rights of the 
estate <ind Debtors to such recovery, Trustee may 
renotice his for an hcanng. No !lnal order will 
JIM D. PAPPAS 
CHIEF US BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
In Re 
Vol. 03, No. 44 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COlm.T 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
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l 67 
COEDHART & GOEDHART, ci PARTNERSHIP. dba GOOD 
HAl<'T' DALI< Y, 
Debtor. 
NWT, INC. <md EVANS GRAIN, FEED AND SEED COMPANY, 
an fdaho corporation, 
Pi<1in1iffs, 
GOEDHART & GOEDHART, a partnership d/b/a GOOD HART 
DAIRY and WELLS FARGO BANK, National Association, 
Defend ams. 
Case No. 02-41638 
Case No. 02-6342 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
Richard D, Greer.wood, GREENWOOD & BRODY, Twin 
Palls, Idaho, Attorney for Plainliff NWT Inc. 
Kimbell D. JONES GLEDHILL HESS FUHRMAN 
BRADBURY & EIDEN, Boise, Idaho, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Evans Grain, Feed and Seed 
Brent T. Robinson, LINC & ROBINSON, Rupert, Idaho, 
Attorney for Defendant Cloedhart & Goedhart. 
Larry E. Prince, HOLLAND & HART, Boise, Idaho, Attorney 
for Defendant Wells Bank, National Association. 
Introduction 
This Memorandum of Decision disposes of cross-motions for 
summarv filed in this consolidated adversary proceeding. 
AL issue .. is whether Idaho Code§ 45-180 I cl, seq,, the Idaho statutes 
governing agricultural commodity liens, extend the reach of such 
liens to the dairy cows (and to the milk by those cows) that 
consume agricultural producto to a lien, While 
yet <mother decision from Lhis Court concerning stawtory 
constrnction 111ay hardly seem cause for excitement, the potentially 
faHeaching 1mplirnt.ions of the Court's will likely 
many participants in the markels As a result, the stakes 
in this c::ise arc substumial. 
To dispose of the issues in this action, the Court must endeavm 
to assess the or the statutes This can be a delicate task. 
Judges cal led upon tc apply a statute 
wisdom 10 those who write the statute. 
by a reviewing cou;t in 
and efficacy of the 
' A;; nnc famous jurist describer! the challenge of construing a srmute· 
The .1udgc must always remember that he should 
no further than he is sure the govermncn: would 
have gone. had it been faced with tile before 
i :o prese111 in tl11s case hec;mse the Court If, inv11ed tu the 
collective JUclgmenl of the ldalw and 10 1111rudt: upon 
pr more properly conducted in the Statehouse, no: tlie 
courthouse The Courl decline:, Lhar inv1t<HHHl, 
Procedural Background 
Goedhar: & Gocdhan C'Debtor"), a pat1nersb1p bcLweer; 
m1J 'v11chae1 Goedhan, H dairy farm m Wende1L Idaho, 
under th1: trade name "Good Han ' Debtor filed for rc:ilef 
1111dr:::, l l of the Code on August 2'.1, 2002, Al 
tha: wne, Debtor wac: indebted to, among others, \Vc:lis Fargo H<tnk. 
,~:i:iunal A.'sociation ("Bank"): NWT, Inc, ("N\VT"L and Evmis 
Crain. Feed and ("Evans Grnin"J 
On D(:cember N\VT commenced an ml versury 
the B;mk and Dcblllr as def endams, scekrng 3 
delerflllllClliOn of the and extcnl of the SlalUlOry lien 
it purportedly heid nn Debtor's cows and milk, as well as the 
proceeds from the sale of both, by virtue of lduho Code~ 45-1802, 
Ac'v No. 02-6342. Docket No. l ln response. the Bank, wh1eh 
holds a perfected U CC Anicle Nine security imerest in the same 
collatera:. filed a motion for summa:·y Adv. No, 02-6342. 
Docket No. 10. The Bank rnnlends NWT's statutory lien does not 
atwch Lo any of the collateral al issue, Not NWT 
disagrees, and filed a cross-motrnn for summary Adv, 
No, 02-6?142. Doeket No. 15. 
Evan;; Grain cornmeneed a separate on 
January 30, 2003, claiming it loo held a statutory lien on Debtor's 
cows, milk, and cash sale proceeds under Idaho § 45. 
1802, Adv. No. 03-6031, Docket No. I, Evans Grain also 
that Debtor improperly converted the collateral in which Evans 
Grain had a lien. ld . .lust as NWT had done, Evans Grain named 
the Bank and Debtor as defendants. The Bank moved for summary 
that the statue did not gram Evans Grain a valid 
lien on the cows, milk and proceeds securing the Bank's claim, 
Adv. No. I, Docket l\io. 12. 
In furtherance of the parties' stipulation, the Court consolidated 
on .lune 19, 2003. under A,dvcrsary 
Docket No, 30. Prior to entry of the order 
the actions, but after execution of the stipulaLion, 
Evans Grain filed its own motion for summary judgmem3 Docket 
Ne. 22. 
The Court conducted a hearing on the various motions for 
summary judgment on June 19, 3t which counsel for all the parties, 
ilim. If he 1s in doubt.. he mus\ swp, for he cannot 
lcll thal lhe conf1lcling imcrcsls in the wcicty for 
which he speaks would have 10 u just result. 
ever. Lh ough he is surr' that he know,, what the JUSt 
rcsulr should be. He is not io wbstilute cvc1' Ins 
,1us1er will for theirs; otherwise ii would noi be the 
common will which prev;tils. aJl(! 10 thal extent the 
people would no! govern. 
Learned Hand. How Far is a Judge Free"' Rc11dcr111!' o Dec/,1w11:, lll The 
Sp11i111( LibcrlY.' I1aper.1, and Addresses or Le11mcd }·fond 79. 84 Orting 
Dilliard cd,, New York Vinlagc Book; 1960) 
All frn1hcr docket ref'erences will be to Adv Nu 07.·6342. unless 
01herw1sc inrlicntcd, 
Grnw actually filccl its motion for stnnmary Judgment rn the 
adversary proceeding inilrnted by NVv'T before lhe Coun entered the order 
consolidating the lwt1 aclions The Cou11 perceives nv harm in trcullng the 
l11Cl/l0l1 <IS rrnrcrJy filed Under these CJJ'ClllllSlal\CCS 
,,\,PPFT T ,,\,NT"" Rl~IFF- APPFNDTX R _ \7 
irdudm~ !JehtD:. arpearecl m1cl pmvidecl argumenL, Tile Coun luok 
the issue.s rm.sed hy the mot1uns under advisement. aml ha;, carefully · · , e, C(llEiclered the subm1ss1rn10. and arpHnenLf, D the paruco., This ~'.Ji 
M crnorandum disposes of tlie pendmg muciuns. 
Undisputed Facts 
The followmg fact.' appear undisputed 111 the record, 
Dditur borrowed muney from U1:- Bank. Tll scc:ure !l<, prnmisc 
10 repiiy lb loanf. from the Bank, Debt<ir granted the Bank 
inlercsl in, amung it:, uthcr assets, all its presenl and future dairy 
cuws. mill;, and any cash proceecls received from the of 
tt1c or milk. 'JI 15, Docket No. l, Adv No. 03-6031, 
[; appr:ar;, that thl'. Bm1k rerfectecl it'> seeurny 11llcres1 in 
Debtor's dairy cow:, and milk bdore NWT or Evan•. Ci min ,,uld and 
products w Debtor, At the: tllnc oi thr: 
Dl'.btor owed tile Bank approximately $5.8 
rnilliun. Def.'s Statcrnen'. of Fact,~ 3. Dockc:t No. 11 
NWT buys commudnie~ from the farmers who 
raise. them, and then sclls those cornrnod111e' to !ls custorncrs, 
includmg farmers. Aff of Hamby, ~ 4, Docket No. 2:.J. 
Therefore, NWT an 
by Idaho Code § 45-l 80 I ' 
commodity dealer" as defim~d 
in May, 2001. N'NT sold and 
delivered canola pellets, used as cattle feed, to Dcbtor. Id. al~[ 5. 
Debtor failed lo pay for the deliveries NWT made tc Debtor between 
April 25 and July 9, 2002. As a rcsult. Debtor owecl NWT 
£20,021,04, Id, at~ 7; Ex, B. NWT thereafter timely filed wntlen 
claims of"commodity dealer liens" with the Idaho of State 
as provided in Idaho Ccide § 45-180 I eL for the balance 
owed by Debtor. AfL of Greenwood, Doeket No. J 6, These claims 
of lien purpom:dly covered Debtor's dairy cattle, milk, and any 
canola pellets still on hand at Debtor's farm. id, at Ex. A &\,; 
Evans Grain is also an agricultural dealer as defined 'ff 
by Idaho Code § 45-1801 (2). Evans Grain sold Debtor whey. 
rnttonseed, and com distillers, all of which Debtor used 
feed. Aff. of Blauer, ~ 7, Docket No, 24. Prior lo the 
Evans Grain made deliveries to Debtor valued at $70,52 LOO, for 
On November 15, 2002, Evans Grain also 
recorded dealer liens with the Secretary of State that 
to attaeh to Debtor's dairy cattle, milk, and any cottonseed 
rP.rr1;i1n,1no at Debtor's faim. Aff of Counsel, Ex, A., Docket No. 23. 
On May 19, 2003, this Court entered 3n order 
Bank relief from the automatie stay with respect to Debtor's 
herd, milk;and any feed on hand, C:a,<;e No. Q2.t, I 6J8. Docket No 
" For rurpuscs of ldaho Code ~ &5. J 80 I el. seq.: 
'Agricultural cornmodity dealer' mctms 'my person 
wlio con'.racls for or sohclls any agricuhural product 
from an agricultural producer or negotiates !lie 
conslgnmcm purchase of any agriculwral product. 
01 receives for t:nlc. rc;;ule or shipme111 fnr storage, 
pmccssing. cleaning or reconditioning, auy 
agricullurnl pmduct, or who huys tlurin~ an) 
calendar yea;. at least ten l110J1&and dollars ($10,000) 
w011li of agricuhw;il prod11cls from the prnduccr or 
producers of the commodity. Agricullurnl 
comn1odity dealer sh,tll no: Jllcan a person wJio 
purcha.,cs ugricul1urnl rrnclocts for Im own 11.,e 
seed or feed, 
ldah0 Corl~§ 45-J 80 I CJ 
IN RE GOEDiiART & COEDHAfff 
I ]5' Shortly tlicrcaltcr, the U.S. Trustee filed Cl 1TJotiun to convert 
Dcbtor',s Chapter 11 case to one under Chapter 7, or in tk 
alterna[lve, tu dismiss the case, because Debtor was no longer 
operating :1 dairy farm. Case No. 02-41638. Duckl'.1 No. 149. ThJI 
mouun remains pending at this time." 
On the b<Jsis or this record, the Court presumes al I of Debtor's 
cows and milk have been, or shortly will be, soid. So, too. the Court 
confidently assumes. although the record docs not demonstrnte ii. 
that tile sale. pruceec!s arc insufficicrn to satisl·y in lul I the just dchts 
ol the Bank. NWT. and Evans Grain. Wliik none or the pmties 
discuss in the recurd the status or any rem11ining feed snld to Debtor 
by NWT or Evans Grain, and while the Bank apparently does not 
challenge the priority or the commodity dealers' liens in that reed. 
che Court also assumes there is an inadequnte amount or feed or: 
hand to pay the dealers' accounts. Thus, the dispute in this acllon 
concerns which creditors are entitled to the cash procee.ds from the 
sale or Debtor's dairy cows and miTk. and which creditors must look 
elsewhere, if al all. for payment. Seen in this fashion, the action 
presents a classic bankruptcy confrontation. 
The Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to imerrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving parry is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056 (incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P 56 for 
application in adversary proceedings). See also Elsaesser v. Central 
Pre-Mix Concrete Ca. (In re Pioneer Constr., Inc.), 01.2 l.B.C.R. 
66. 66 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001); Esposito v. Nayes (Jn re Lake 
Cauntrv investments, LLC). 255 B.R. 588. 596-97 (Bankr D. Idaho 
2000) 
The parties agree that all material facts in this matter are 
undisputed, at le:ist for purposes of disposition of the pending 
motions. Simply put. the Court must therefore decide which of the 
parties is entitled to the paramount protection or the law_ 
Disposition of the [ssues 
A. [daho Code § 45-1802 and the positions of the parties 
In 1983, the Idaho Legislature enacted what became Idaho 
Code § 45-1802, a statute to protect "agricultural commodity 
producers" and "agric.u ltural commodity dealers" by providing them 
a statutory lien for the unpaid price or "agricultural prnducts"7 sold 
' By stipulation of the panics during the hearing and pursuant to Fed. R. 
EvJCI. 201. ihe Court lakes .iuclicial notice of its fJlcs and records m Debtor's 
bankrnpLcy case. Case No 02-d 1638. 
" The Cour1 previously notified counsel for the panics that ii would defer 
entry of a decision on the summary judgment rnotio11s until the U.S. 
Trustee's motion had been resolved. See Letter lo Counsel dated July 7. 
2003. Docket No. 31 However, Lhe Coun 1econsidcred its reluctance lo 
act. The issues raised here cU'e impmtant 111 this case a11d in others pending 
bel'ore the Coult. If the bankruptcy case convens Lo Chapter 7. the issues 
will remain. Moreover. given the advanced procedural stalu.s of this 
adversary proceeding, ancl the efforts <expcnclcd hy the par1ies and the Court 
1n cnnnect1on with the summary _1uclg111erH molions, 1t wnulcl be most 
econom1cal for this Court to Jecicle the pc.nding rnollons. even though Lile 
ba11k111ptcy case may be clisrnissed. 
1~·or p1irposcs of lrlaho Code § cl'i-180 I er. seq.· 
'AgriculturnJ product' means wheat. corn, oats. 
barley, rye. lentils. soybeans. gram sorghum, dry 
beans <lllll [lC<l.'.-., (Jeans.. safnciwer. SllllnO\Vl':J Sl;eds. 
/\PPi::TT /<.."t\.TT'C.:RPl]:;]::'_ f<..ppi:;~TnTYR_'.\1 
cru rncR i69 
to others The statute origi11ally provided: 
An agnculturnl commodity producer or cm ;igricultural 
commodity dc;iler who sells an agricultural product has a 
lien on the agricultural prnclucr or the proceeds of the sale 
or the agriculturnl product until payment is made i11 full. 
/\ct ol Apr. 12, 1983. ch. 202, ~ I, 1983 Idaho Sess. Laws :'>49 
(amended 1989). In 1989. the Idaho Legislature rnrn~nded the stmute 
by adding a second sentence. The new provision read: 
The I ien cre:ned ir. this chapter m:1y attach regardless or 
whether the purchaser USl'.S the agricultural prnduct 
purcha;,ed to increase the value or his livestock or whether 
he uses the agricultural product purchased to maintain the 
value, health or status or his livestock without actually 
increasing the value of his agricultural product. 
Act of Apr. 4, 1989, ch. 299, §I. 1989 Idaho Seso.. Liws 746 
(codified as amended Idaho Code § 45-1802).' 
Evans Grain and NWT contend the language of § 45-1802, 
particularly the second sentence added by the Idaho Legislature in 
1989, extends the lien arising on their sale of agricultural products 
to Debtor beyond the agricultural products themselves. to include 
Debtor's dairy cows, the milk those cows produce, and any cash 
proceeds received upon sale of the cows or milk. Conversely, the 
Bank insists the language of Idaho Code § 45-1802 allows the 
commodity sellers a lien only on the agricultural products sold, and 
on any proceeds generated from a subsequent sale of the agricultural 
products, but not on any other property. 
B. Principals of statutory construction 
A federal coun inte111reting a state statute must rely upon the 
enacting state's rules of statutory construction, as articulated by the 
tame mustards, rapeseed. flaxseed, leguminous seed 
or other small seed. or any other agricultural 
commodity, including any of the foregoing, whether 
cleaned, processed. treated, reconditioned or whether 
mixed. rolled or combined in any fashion or by any 
means tn create a prnduet used as a111mal, poultr-y or 
fish feed. 
Idaho Code~ 45-180i(I). It is undisputed that the products sold by NWT 
ancl Evan.s Gram to Debtor were "agricultural prnducts" covered by the lien 
statutes. 
' The statute currently provides: 
An agricultural commodity producer or an 
agricultural cummodily dealer who sells, or deliveis 
under contract or lnilrnent, an agncultural product 
has a lien on tile agricultural product o" the proceeds 
of the sale of the agncultural product as prnvidecl in 
section 4.~-1804. Idaho Code. The lien created in 
this chapter may anach regardless of whether the 
purchaser uses the agncultural product purchased Lo 
inc1easc the value or his livestock or whether he uses 
the agricultural product purchased to rnaintarn the 
value. health or status of his livestock without 
actually increasing the value of his agricuituraJ 
prnclucl. 
ldaho Cocle ~ 45-180:'. f\ny fur1her changes lo the statute made by rhc 
l 9R9 or other amendments are not ~tissue m this action. 
en.:'' mer< 170 
courb of thm state. Sec. e.g., 111 re Ltircs. i 8S FJd 1166, 1168 (CJ"' 
Cir. 1999) (rc:lying on ldahu rules of ccmstruction in 111terpreLing 
ldaho's exemption Jaws) In Idaho, ''statutory 1merprelallon begim 
with the literal words of thl'. statute, and this language should be 
given its plain, obvious, and ratiunal meaning." Scwurd i Poe/fie 
Hide & Fur Depm, GS f'.3d :i:11. 533 (Idaho 2003) (1ntcrnal 
qummiuns and cicmiom omiued) If, however. the language of a 
statute is ambiguous. ;; court may employ other Louis in deciphering 
the statutc"s meaning. including reJcrcnce to other statutes 
concemrng the samt: subject matter if the statute 1s hut one pan or a 
larger statutory scheme; tile context of the statutory language; the 
public policy advancc:d by the statute: and any pc:ninenl legislative 
history. Idaho\'. Pac/ore!:, 5 I P 3ci 443. 44(1 (Idaho Ct. App 200:\J: 
Jdulw \.Cudd, 51 P.3d 439, 441 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) ("iW]t: also 
look tu other stawtes in tht same title or act relating tu the same 
subject matter and read them together. in urdcr to discern thl'. 
legislative mlt:nt"J 
As for 1dentify111g ambiguity: 
A statute is ambiguous when the meaning is so doubtful 
or obscure thal "reasonable minds might be uncertain or 
disagree as to its meaning . However, ambiguity is not 
established merely because different possible 
interpretations are presented to a court. II th is were the 
case then all statutes tJ-1at are the subject of litigation could 
be considered ambiguous [A] statute is not 
ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise 
more than one interpretation of it ... 
BJ-IA Invs, Inc. v. Ciry of Boise, 63 P.3d 482, 484 (Idaho 2003) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted) In construing an 
ambiguous statute, "constmctions that would lead to absurd or 
unreasonably harsh results are disfavored," Friends of Farm to 
Markei v. Valley Countv, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (Idaho 2002) (quoting 
Gavica v. Hanson, 608 P.'.2d 861, 863 (Idaho 1980)), as are 
constructions that render statutory language superfluous or 
insignificant. Id. Regarding amendments to statutes, il must be 
presumed that the legislature intended to clarify, strengthen or make 
some change to existing law. Seward, 65 P.3d at 534. 
Finally. while statutes creatmg lien rights are to be liberally 
construed "with a view to effect tl1eir objects and promote Jl!Slice," 
Bo leer v. Boren, 934 P.2d 951, 96 l (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) 
(interpreting mechanic's lien stat.lite ancl quoting Me1ropo!i1an Life 
Ins. Co. v. Firs/ Sccuril» Bank of Idolw, 491 P.2cl 1261, 1265 
(1971 )), "tl1is rule. . does not permit the Court Lo create a lien 
where none exists or was intended by the legislature." L & W 
Sr<JlfJh· Corp. l» Chari rand Fwnih Tmst, 40 P.ld 96, I 0 l (Idaho 
2003) (internal citations omiuccl). 
C. Interpreting Idaho Code ~ 45-1802 
NWT and Evans Grain must acknowledge that ldaho Code~ 
4'\-1802 clues nol exprl'.ssly 1mivicle that rn1 agricultural cornmoclity 
lien extends beyond Lile agricullural products solcl, yet alone to 
cows. milk, or cash proceeds. Instead, they argue that the stalctte, 
read as a whole, is ambiguous, and when examined carefully, it 
becomes appilrcnt lhat the Legislature rncanl for the lirn to c:<tcnd 
beyond agricultural products. However. in construing what the 
statute means, Lhc Court's analysis must begin wilh whal the slatulc 
SO_)'.\. 
The first sentence of amended Idaho Code \i 45-1802 is clear 
and unambiguous. It creates a lien in favor of agricultural 
commodity producers (i.e .. Lhe farmers whc1 produce the products) 
ancl agricnltura! commodity dcalcr·s (e.g .. the cattle feed snppliers in 
this case). Thal lien extends to the agricultural products sold a11d lo 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - APPENDIX B - 34 
!Df\f-1() BANKRUPTCY cmnn REPORT 
t I 1e proceeds from a subsequent sak or the agriculLural procluct 
Tc; 1llustrnte the extenl or thl'. lien. one need only imagine <1 
farmer who raises and sells com Lo a Jiveslod: feed dealer on credl\ ~ 
A., a rl'.sult oi that lrans<iction, the farmer 1s gra!llt:d a statutory lien 
crn the corn while it is in the dealer's possession When the de~1ler 
sells L11e com Lo another (say. tu a fetd Jut), the farmer's lien extend;: 
Lo any cash proceeds thc dealer received from Lhe sale. ln addition. 
at this poml, a staLUtory lien anses in favor of the deakr on the corn 
al the feed I lll. 
In this context. "agricultural product" is a term or art Lhat is 
specii'ically defined in Idaho Cude§ 45-1801(1; for purposes of 
identifying the eoll ateral Lo which the commoc\1ty i1e11 created i11 
Idaho Code ~ 45-1802 mc1y atLach. When the Legislature ong1rn1lly 
drafted this statute. it rnuld h~1vc provided wilhin Lh1: statutory 
defmitiun of agricultural product thai the lien would at:.ach lO 
livestod: that consume the agricultural commodity. or the proceeds 
or products of thal livestock. such as milk produced hy duiry cows 
So, too, the Legislature could have later added langui.!ge in Idaho 
Code ti 45-1802 Lo extend the reach of the lien to animals that 
ccmsumt ag:icullural products already suh_jecl LO '' lien. The 
Legislature did neither. This is significant. 
As stated above. the first sentence of Idaho Cock § 45-1802 is 
clear and unamh1guous. Therefore, it ts unnecessary. and it wouid 
he inappropriate, for the Court to resort LO any of the various tools 
of statutory construction to divine any meaning beyond giving the 
language employed by the Legislature its plain and ordinary 
meaning. The Court must presume the Legislature said what it 
meant and meant only what it said. 
The second sentence or the statute, added in 1989. is also plain 
on its face. It clarifies the first sentence. It explains that the ~' 
statutory agricultural commodity lien created by the first sentence 
shall attach to the agricultural product, and to the proceeds from the 
sale of that product, without regard to whether the purchaser uses the 
commodity for either of two different purposes, namely, to increase 
the value of livestock or to maintain the value of livestock. Again, 
while it easily could have done, so, the Legislature did nm utilize 
language in the l 989 amendment to Idaho Code § 45-J 802 that 
expands the scope or kinds of property to which a commodity lien 
will attach. 
Admittedly, the reference to livestock in the second sentence of 
ldaho Code§ 45-1802, when one considers the absence of any other 
s11ch ref ercnces in the lien statutes, is perhaps curious. and the 
Legislature's goal in making this change has been the subject of 
debate by the parties in tlm action. However, while NWT and Evans 
Grain argue otherwise, the amendmenl to lclal10 Code § 45-1802 did 
not render the statute ambiguous simply because their creative 
lawyers are abk Lu develop alternative explanations for lhc reference 
to livestock in the second sentence. To be sure. Lhe con:;tructiun 
urged by NWT and Evans Grain. that Lhc .second sentence was 
intended to extend the commuclity lien lo any liveslock consuming 
calllc feed. as well as to Lhe milk produced by those t:atlle. provides 
more potent protection for Lhc unpaid comrnodily dealer. But, under 
Idaho law, statutes that arc not ambiguous need not be comtrued in 
Lhe most poweriul or far-reaching manner. Morl'.ovcr. ns nolcd 
above. whiil'. lien statules should be liberally construc!d, such a 
construction can not include creating a lien where none exists. L & 
W Su11I1IY Cmv. 40 f'.3d at I Ol. Rather, the second sentence of 
ldal10 Code§ 45-1802 musl be read so as to give effect lCJ the plain, ~ 
obvious. and ralional meaning of the tcxl Seward, 65 P.3d at 5'.1:1. 
Constming the statute according LO its plain meaning does not 
render any portion or the commodity lien law supernuons Friends 
of Form lo Murker. 46 P :id at 14. Granted. interpreting the second 
sentence as a clarif1cation that a commoclity lien can attach Lo the 
agricu]lural producl or rhe prnseed:. from its :.ubscquenl sale 
the of the agricultural proclucl may 
no1 effect any extensive change in lhe reacl1 or impact of the statute. 
However, such ar, i:. consistent with the import of the 
1 anguagc of lhe sl;itule 
Evans Grain also to the 
lclaho of State's 45-l 802. 
The of State published the form lo be used by agncultura1 
commodity dealers and a lien. Thar 
a rnong the kinds of property in whicti 
Grain urges that the ol Swte's 
tanwmount to u fcumal lhal the lkn 
bOlh liveswck and milk 
Evans 
of such a form is 
by the ,,lalULC 
extends Lo livestock and milk. :m opinion which should be given 
great weigill m the statute. 
The Cour: has considered this argument, but concludes tt is 
1napplieabie in tt1is context. The Idaho of Slate is not an 
re leva!ll srntute. See Pear/ v. Bd 
State Bd oflvfedicme, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168 (ldaho 2002) 
the star.dard for applying agency deference). Therefore. even 1f the 
inclusion of livestock and milk on the "official" form for 
a lien does indeed represent the Secretary of State's 
the statute, something the Court doubts, the agency's opinio1; is not 
en lit led to deference. 
NWT and Evans Grain are likely disappointed in the Court's 
conclusion that the statute is not ambiguous. Howeve:, 
assuming the meaning of the statute can not be determined 
reference to the language in the law does not mean these 
lien cia1m:mts ;nust prevail. ln fact. even if the addition of the 
secortd sentence to Idaho Code § 45- 1802 in l 989 somehow 
rendered the statute ambiguous such that the Court should consider 
the fu!I panoply of statutory construction tools. the 
the statute by the Court would be no different. 
to the other provisions with agricultural 
liens, the statutory framework as a whole reflects n 
intent that commodity liens not extend to livestock. 
Indeed. the very next provision of the Idaho Code that: 
The lien created by [ § 45- l 802) at1aches to 1he 
subsequent 
producf on the elate the 
product is physically deli vcrcd lo the 
or on the date any final payment is due, and 
lo the . producer or ... dealer . . whichever 
occurs last. 
added) So, loo, in the provision 
lien created by the statures. the 
The lien created by I§ 45. 1802] is preferred lo a lien or 
security interest in Cavor of a creditor of the purchaser, 
of whether the creditor's lien or security 
111tcn;st al/aches to the agricuiwralproducr or proceeds 
.m!e 1/ie bdore nr after the 
[§ 4)- 1802] attaches. 
ldahc Code§ 45-1805 added) Thus. in no fewer than 
three separnle imtance~. the Idaho rndicaled ils intent 
tlwt ;.1 c;1mnrndily lien cHtaclJ oniy Lo lhe agricultural product sold 
clllC to the proceeds from subsequent sale or the product. but not to 
any nlher •ypes of property . 
. APPFT r ANT'C:. HRTFF APPr:'JnTY R' '" 
Tlw use of I he term product" :tlso 
evidences an intent that liem; not attach Lo iivesLoek ur 
any products thereof P.s mentioned above, "agricuiturnl product" 
Is defined in ldaho Code § 45- I 801 ( 1) Thal defi nnion does not 
include livestock or milk, o:· the rrom the sale of such. 
Interestingly, during :he s:ime session that the ldaJ10 Legislature 
amenacd Idaho Code§ 45-1802, Jt also amendc~d rhe definition of 
"agnculturai product" by that a commodity lien would 
continue despite the Caci that a raw product was processed in some 
fash10r. for use as foed. Act ot' Apr. 3. J 989, ch. 265, § I, 1989 
[claho Sess. Laws 644 (codil'iecl as amended at Idaho Code§ 45-
180!( I JJ The Legislature was obviously Lile 
reach of the !icon where Lhe agr·icultura! producl 
incorporatecl or "processed m some fashion" 
thl'.rcforc fair to infer L.~at had the Legislature also intendea tile iien 
lo extend to the animals that consume an or Lo 
the products of those animills, it could have amended the statute:. to 
provide rnch. 
In ld::ihc, there is a strong the amendment 
of sunutes by implication. Idaho v. 990 P.2d 144. 148 
(Idaho Ct. App. I 999) ("Statutory amendment by is 
disfavored and will not be inferred absent clear 
The 1989 amendment to Idaho Code § 45-1802 
scope of the lien as created in the first sentence of that statute, nor 
is it clear that the 1989 legislature intended thc amendment to Idaho 
Code § 45-1802 to aller Idaho Code §§ 45-l 803 and I 805. Were 
the Court to read Idaho Code § 45- l 802 in the manner NWT and 
Evans Grain suggest, an inconsistency in the statutes would result, 
and questions would be created under Idaho Code § § 45- 1803 and 
1805 regarding when a lien on livest0ck would altach and as to the 
of such a lien. NWT's and Evans Grain's interpretation 
would require the Court to not only read into Idaho Code § 45-1 802 
that the text does not provide. but also to assume the 
1989 amendment modified the other two statutes as well. 
reference to the legislative history of the statute in this 
instance is frustrating and fruitless. The record presented by the 
to the Court provides but a fleeting glimpse of the purpose 
for the 1989 amendment. At the outset. the Court is skeptical that 
the intent of the l 989 legislature in adopting an amendment to a 
statute enacted years earlier is the only relevant legislmive history to 
be considered here. As one court observed: 
Ceneral ly. and perhaps wi thm!t cxc:eption, 
intent in stalutory interpretation is helpful only if it is the 
meaning attributed by the er.acting body. not the 
of an amending body. If defcndunt's 
argument had merit. then any leg1sla11ve session could 
alter tl1e of laws predating their power lo 
by d::claring a legislative intent when 
lilws that alter or the meaning of Jaw No 
suprorts such a proposition and lo 
woulc be an inv1taLion to all so1ts of legislative 
Lehmann v. Nat'l /ns. Co., 979 F Supp. 1290. 1292 (D. 
Monl l 
Th:~ from the 1989 session offers no 
definitive insight mto the legislature's intent because the 
commentmrm, offered inconsistent views on the amendment's goal. 
111stance, Representative Newcomb'' inchcmed the arnendrnem 
\\[1" offl:reci to prciviclc tha: "a lien ha;, validity or rrn1y attach even 
the leec\ feel tn an arnmal (ioe', no: acid value to the animal but JUSi 
rnn1mairt' tL" Se11alc Agric Comm. M11w1e.1, 1989 I'' 
al 4 (Idaho i CJ89) (statement of Rep Newcomb! 
Newcomb ;:ilso rcferemxd an s1mc 
d1~;u1c: court case "that had refuted tlm concept" id BuL in a 
cl1fferen1 com1mllec hcanng. Newcomb indicatt:d he 
:1d:e.vecl lrn,, neen understood in lhe feed industry that wnen feed 
v;;1s suld le \11] tO!~!;umer, Lhm thl' feed hen would attach lo the 
11nirnal which was fed " House Agne A!frurs Comm. 
M1n11ws. l 98lJ at (ldano l 989 J (Wllemen\ of Rc:p 
Newcomb) However, one belief as w an cnure 
views offer~ little into how Idaho Code § 45~ 
180'.1 should be particularly when no state appellate 
coun has construed the statute and the tcx! unambiguously permits 
a comrnochty lie,n ttJ allach to the agricultural produc sold and 
the procetods from~ subsequent sale oi the agricultural prc1ducL 
Ir. contrast. Senator "pornted out the difficuity of 
understanding either the intent m the contained in the bill 
:· Senate Agne Af(azr.s Comm. Minuie.L l 989 Leg .. J" Sess. al 
4 (Statement of Sen Smyser). A of the Idaho Bankers 
AssociaLion "stated that his orgar.i1,at1or. could m~1ther support nor 
oppose the legislation since they were unable to understand what the 
intent of the bill is." id. (statement of Berne Jensen). Finally. an 
attorney for tbe same associatron observed lhal the court case 
referenced by Representative Newcomb assumed a lien 
on feed continued in cows and the language of the 1 amendment 
mistakenly makes the same assumption, id. (statement of Pat 
Col'.ins). 
The only conclusion that can be safely drawn from the scant 
i history is tha! the Legislature, or at least those 
individual lawmakers who participated in the passage of the 
amendment rn the lien statute, were faced with amending 
thal was and they disagreed over whether Idaho Code 
§ 45-1802. it existed at that time, allowed a commodity Hen to 
attach to livesto:::k, Like the senator quoted above. frorn a review of 
this reccrd of in the Legislature, the Court is uncertain 
and perplexed about the intended purpose of the 1989 amendment 
tc § 45- J 802 Unless tlle Court can confidently discem 
inLent from the history of the it should hesitate to 
convert speculation into law. 
In short even were the Coun to find ldaho Code § 45-1802 
ambiguous. the application t>f the tools of statutory 
constructton does not of the statute extending tht: 
commodity lien to diliry cows thal consume feed or to tlle milk such 
cows produce, The relevant offers little 
in1crpret1ve guidance. ancl instead show;, there was considerable 
disagreement and confusion about the of the I 989 add!lion 
to Idaho Code§ 45-180'.2 at the time the second senlcnce was added. 
On the other hand. the statute wntten preserves 
corn;1stency by preventing the of an mherwise 
statutory scheme. ancl avoids the specter of 
implication. 
Conclusion 
'' Mr. l~cwcomb was a member or tile House Agricultural Affairs 
Committee and sponsor or the original Hou.1c bill which W<L' lmcr 
arnc.nded by the Senate, 
'" Mr Smyser was a 1m:mbe1 of the Senate Agricul1urat Affairs 
Commit lee. 
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Thv ldalrn !A:gisiature presumably desired 111 
agricultural commoditieto some modicum of prntecuon agarn;;! the 
bt! yer' ,, hrok.e1: prumi.c.c tu pay for their nru~lucl" NWT':; anc! Evan' ~· 
Gram s interpretation ol Lhc lien st111ute,, wuuld extend that 
protect1(11i tr\ th use· 111sU111cc.s where the buyer's animals consumr: the 
pr,uducl,, sold. Their view ur the statute rnay or may not represent 
p1il1cy. Extending the reach of the: lien, while it rrotew, 
commodity dealer~. impam, tht.: right:. of o!bn cn:ditor:, who have 
credil tu the farmer Ii i:c not the of the Court. 
however. w rlcterrrnnc wbicl1crechtors,11; rnntter oi policy. sbrn,ld 
or should rrn< be 
of the s!atutl'. is urnirnbiguou:, and the Coun i.c, 
H as written. There i,, ;io support for an 
anmitiow, extcmwn of the reach o' the lien created rn the 
of thl' statute Because: !d~ho Codt: ~ 4.'» l HO'.' is ckar, <ind because 
ol th:: su.irnte resmcts tht scope of tl1c lil!n to the 
sold and ttJ the proceeds frorn <1 subsequent sale 
of that product. rhe Coon declines the lemptauon to broaden il~ 
scope. The statute does noL extend an agricultural lien 
w livestock that consume feed covered by a commodity lien. tu the 
from the sale of such livestock. or to the milk or other 
products by such JivesLock. lf the Idaho 
intend;, to cast such a wide net. it must ciearly and cogently express 
thal iment. 11 
As a matter of law. the Bank is correct that NWT's and Evans 
Grain· s statutory liens did not extend to Debtor's dairy cows. milk 
or to the cash sale proceeds of those items, The Bank's motions for 
summary judgment will be 
motions for summary 
will be entered. 
and NWT's and Evans Grain's 
will be denied. A separate order 
DATED This 11 rn day of August. 2003. 
JIM D. PAPPAS 
CHJEF U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
11 B(;cansc of its ruling, lhc Cmn\ need !lol considct the m<•ny and complex 
questions and implicatiorn, naturally flowing from a broad reading of the 
statute. For example. in this instance, do the commodity sellers· liens 
extend sokly 10 those animals thal actually consurnec the agncullllral 
products sold to Debtor') If who bears the burden nf provrng wlucb 
animals dirt or did not. consume the feed? Do the hens aL10 extend to the 
calves produced by tlw rnws'i Would the liens extend lo the compost 
manufactured fron1 the manure prociucccl by the herd'! Al what poinl in 
lime do the liens on the livestock attach and when <uc they extinguished or 
1erminatccJ'I Thcsc ;uc .1usr a few of the difficult. hul vitally impo11JnL 
policy issue~ genernteG by an expansive reading or the statutes. Giv~n lhc 
realitie~ of bu.,inc,,s and the irnpo!lance of crcci11 to today's farmers,!( is 
doubtful rhe couns can cffocuvely crc:ate wch rules of law on a case-by~ 
basis As with !lw Urnform Co1nrnerc:al Ihc legislature is best 
suited to give comprehensive. balanced consideration 10 the nee,ds and 
expectations of all involved in agri-husint:ss wh(~l! designing such law:.. 
